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WHY NO DUTY?
Stephen D. Sugarman*
SETTING UP THE PROBLEM
Typically, first-year tort students quickly learn that there are several
elements in a cause of action sounding in negligence, one of which is
the matter of duty. Although it is said that the plaintiff possesses the
burden to prove that a legal duty of due care was owed to him, duty is
best understood as a defendant's doctrine. Not only is it convention-
ally the defendant who will contest the issue of duty, but also it is a
finding of no duty that allows a defendant to escape responsibility in
tort for harming another through behavior that was unreasonable (or
could well have been so found).'
Why do we allow wrongdoers to avoid tort liability? After all, de-
nying the plaintiff's claim would appear to undermine a wide range of
justifications usually given for creating fault-based liability in the first
place. Individual justice is sacrificed by not allowing the victim to
have the satisfaction of obtaining a determination that the injurer le-
gally wronged him. The role played by tort liability-deterring the
sort of unreasonable conduct in which the injurer engaged-is aban-
doned. No compensation in tort is forthcoming to the plaintiff from
the at-fault defendant, with the result that the accident costs of the
defendant's misconduct are not thereby internalized into the defen-
dant's activity.
Surely, if we are going to have a common law system of negligence,
there must be a very strong reason for allowing someone to get away
with causing harm to another by failing to act in a way that a reasona-
* Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, UC Berkeley. This contribution to the 17th Annual
Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy honoring Professor Robert L. Rabin is of-
fered as a modest addition to a splendid article by Professor Rabin concerning "no duty" in tort:
Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA.
L. REV. 925 (1981).
1. The presumption that there is a duty to exercise due care, which in exceptional cases is
overridden by "an articulated countervailing principle or policy," is embraced by the Restatement
(Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
(2010).
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ble person would have. I explore those situations and their justifica-
tions in this Article.2
By way of a bit of ground clearing, I will put aside cases in which
the defendant escapes liability because the harm he caused is not
fairly part of the careless risk he took. From my perspective, these
cases, which we used to call "no proximate cause" cases,3 raise differ-
ent issues of individual fairness that are outside my current inquiry. I
also put aside consideration of the victim's own ordinary negligence in
bringing about his injury. These days, the victim's carelessness results
only in a partial reduction of recovery against a negligent defendant
under the regime of pure comparative fault.4 By contrast, a careless
defendant with no duty to exercise due care completely escapes
liability.5
It is also essential to keep the duty issue separate from the question
of whether or not there was a "breach" of the duty to take due care-
although this is not always easy to do. Someone who owes another a
legal duty and harms the other individual through conduct that is
judged to be reasonable will not be liable in negligence because there
was no breach. For example, if a defendant did not act unreasonably
because it was unforeseeable that her conduct would risk harm to an-
other 6 or because the precaution necessary to avoid the harm would
have been unreasonably burdensome,7 there is no breach rather than
no duty owed to the harmed individual (at least not on these grounds).
The essence of fault-based liability is that duty and causation are
not enough; the defendant's conduct must also have fallen below the
level expected of a reasonable person under the circumstances. In
other words, when a defendant prevails at trial because there was no
breach, this is not a victory on the grounds of no duty (although there
are cases, to be sure, in which a defendant is or would be successful on
2. I previously explored this matter in Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Vi-
sions ofa Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 613-18 (2002), and Stephen D.
Sugarman, A New Approach to Tort Doctrine: Taking the Best from the Civil Law and Common
Law of Canada, in 17 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW, 375, 386-90 (2d ser. 2002). For another
writing on this general theme, see Robert L. Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A
Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2001).
3. The Restatement (Third) of Torts has embraced a "scope of liability" notion in lieu of the
confusing phrase "proximate cause." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSI-
CAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6, at 492 (2010).
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 (2000).
5. I also put aside here the matter of defendants who are more than merely careless; namely,
intentional and reckless wrongdoers.
6. E.g., Bolton v. Stone, [19511 A.C. 850 (H.L.) at 858 ("[T]he further result that injury is
likely to follow must also be such as a reasonable man would contemplate, before he can be
convicted of actionable negligence.").
7. See, e.g., Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 768-69 (La. 1999).
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both grounds). Alas, all too often judges and others talking about no-
breach cases confusingly use no-duty language.8 This is unfortunate.
This is a theme to which I will return in Part III of this Article.
II. WHY MIGHT UNREASONABLE DEFENDANTS ESCAPE TORT
LIABILITY ON No-Dury GROUNDS?
In the following sections, I identify six separate reasons that might
justify a no-duty determination and provide illustrations. For a num-
ber of injuries, one might offer more than one justification for a no-
duty result, and so for purposes of explication, some of the examples
may illustrate more than one justification.
In discussing some examples, I show that even if the right sort of
no-duty argument may be made, it is not necessarily convincing. This
is demonstrated in three ways. First, in some cases the law has
changed over time as courts have rejected the old no-duty argument.
Second, sometimes there is a division among the states, with some
embracing the no-duty argument and others declining to do so. Third,
for some examples I will offer my own criticism of the no-duty rules.
This is all to emphasize that my central goal here is not to reshape the
law as to when a tort duty is or is not owed. Rather, my primary
objective is to show how no-duty decisions may be gathered up from
all corners of tort doctrine and put into six categories. These catego-
ries, or types of arguments, seek to justify relieving a tort defendant of
liability not because a jury should find his conduct faultless, but rather
because of overriding considerations that free from tort liability some-
one who a jury might have found to have acted in an unreasonably
careless way.
I loosely group the no-duty justifications into two bunches. The
first bunch appeals to utilitarian considerations, the second to matters
of moral value.
A. Tort Is the Wrong Regime to Deal with the Victim's Complaint
One justification for finding that no duty exists is that the victim
who turns to tort law is looking in the wrong place for a remedy.
There is a place (or are places) to deal with her complaint, but that
place is not tort law. A clear example of this is the American law on
workplace injuries with regard to claims made by employees against
their employers. Employers owe their workers no duty of due care in
tort because the workers' compensation system has replaced tort law
8. See, e.g., Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 94 (N.Y. 1919).
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as the mechanism for providing compensation to victims.9 In addition,
it might be argued that a combination of workers' compensation fund-
ing mechanisms and other institutions (like occupational safety agen-
cies and unions) have replaced tort as other ways of assuring workers
with reasonably safe workplaces. Of course, this is an instance in
which a finding of no duty in tort is brought about by statute, and
many of my examples will be common law no-duty cases. But this
example illustrates the general point that the claimant who would try
to sue in tort would be told that he is in the wrong realm.
The "fireman's rule" provides that property owners who carelessly
set fires that require the services of firefighters are not liable in tort to
those firefighters who are injured battling the flames.10 Proponents
offer many reasons for the rule, although some criticize the rule and
not all states have adopted it." I focus here on the reason that be-
cause firefighters already receive generous disability benefits that
come with their jobs, they should turn exclusively to that form of com-
pensation rather than to tort law. This is a no-duty way of thinking
about the fireman's rule, and it parallels the workers' compensation
solution. In effect, the property owner-who pays taxes that are used
to hire firefighters and to provide them with disability benefits when
injured-is viewed as a temporary employer of the firefighter who was
hurt while combating the property owner's blaze.
When initially enacted, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (NVICP)12 appeared to allow those who said they were vic-
tims of the unwanted side effects of vaccinations to recover either
from the plan's fund or in tort (subject to the requirement that the
victim first go through the fund's claims process).' 3 Recently, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled out the tort remedy for design-defect claims
against vaccine manufacturers on so-called "preemption" grounds
9. It should be noted that the American solution is by no means the only way to deal with
such accidents. European nations tend to allow both workers' compensation claims and tort
claims (allowing recovery in tort only for damages not already provided by the country's indus-
trial injury scheme), and Israel relies only on tort, not having adopted a specific workplace injury
compensation scheme. Hence, unlike employers in the United States, employers in those na-
tions do have a tort duty of due care to their workers.
10. E.g., Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208, 209-10 (Conn. 2004).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-106 (McKinney 2010) (permitting recovery for "neg-
lect, willful omission, or intentional, willful or culpable conduct"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-21
(West 2000) (same).
12. 42 U.S.C. H§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006).
13. See id. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A).
672 [Vol. 61:669
WHY NO DUTY?
under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 14 This no-duty re-
sult was achieved by Justice Scalia's remarkable grammatical tour de
force, in which he interpreted the word "unavoidable" in the statute to
mean (or include) "avoidable."15 I find it utterly baffling that some-
one like Justice Scalia, who is thought to interpret statutes by the sim-
ple reading of the plain text, would reach such a result. His opinion
also reflects a misunderstanding of the state of tort law at the time the
NVICP was enacted. But all of this carping is for another day. The
point is that concerns about whether vaccines were properly designed
are now turned over exclusively to the Federal and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), with its expertise, and away from trial judges and juries as
a result of the 6-2 decision in Bruesewitz. And if injured victims are
to obtain any compensation, it is to come from the NVICP fund and
not tort law.
This is but the latest in a line of pro-defendant decisions in which
the Supreme Court has interpreted congressional language as pre-
empting the claimant from seeking a tort remedy, thereby freeing the
defendant from a tort duty to exercise due care. In these cases, the
Court has concluded that tort is no longer a proper place for individu-
als to try their complaints about, say, the design of medical deviceS16
or the warnings contained on cigarette packages and in advertise-
ments.' 7 Rather, the FDA or Congress is the final word on whether
reasonable precautions were taken, which results in the defendant ow-
ing no duty in tort to the claimant.
In the examples so far discussed, the government has created alter-
natives to tort for airing victim concerns. Consider next the profes-
sional athlete who is injured on the field by a carelessly behaving
competitor. Generally speaking, for conduct that is merely negligent,
there is no tort remedy.18 One justification for this no-duty solution is
that professional sports have privately developed mechanisms for
dealing with the social goals said to be advanced by tort law, and they
are the method for dealing with careless conduct that injures athletes.
More precisely, professional sports have elaborate on- and off-field
penalty mechanisms for dealing with misconduct that takes place dur-
14. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011). Although victims of manufactur-
ing-defect claims continue to be able to sue in tort, those are rarely, if ever, the basis for claims
under this program.
15. See id. at 1075-76.
16. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323-30 (2008). But see Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concerning prescription drugs rather than medical devices).
17. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
18. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1979).
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ing the game.19 These are thought to well serve the punishment, de-
terrence, and justice goals of tort law. As for compensation, there is a
well-developed system outside of tort law as well-the combination of
guaranteed contracts (when available) and disability insurance. Those
arrangements are ones to which professional athletes have ready ac-
cess, given that they have agents who know about these opportunities,
to say nothing of their typical union membership in a body that is
concerned about the future lives of those who are injured while play-
ing, including those injured by the unreasonable behavior of another
player.
In a similar vein, most states have concluded that if one's property
has burned in a fire because the relevant water company carelessly
failed to have water available to fight the fire, the property owner
generally has no valid legal claim against the water company because
the company owes him no duty to act with due care. 20 This is an ex-
ample in which the property owner clearly relies on the water being
competently supplied, believing that alternative fire-fighting water
supplies need not be arranged. Normally one would think that there
would be a legal duty owed to the property owner, and a few states
reach that result.21 But where there is no duty in tort, one justification
is that, in this setting, the victim should look to the institution of pri-
vate fire insurance rather than tort law to obtain compensation. Fire
insurance is widely available, widely bought, and something that soci-
ety thinks responsible property owners should obtain. Hence, in real-
ity, the tort claim would generally involve a fight between the fire
insurance company and the water company. Viewed that way, many
believe that it is better for the loss to fall on the fire insurer because it
is in a good position to price its insurance based on each specific piece
of property's fire risk; the water company, by contrast, will generally
only charge the municipality a bulk rate for the water pressure in the
lines that lead to all of the hydrants in the jurisdiction.22
For another example, when the media negligently publishes some-
thing defamatory about a public figure, that victim may not success-
fully sue the publisher because, as a matter of federal constitutional
19. See, e.g., NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES AND CASEBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2011), available at http://www.blogandtackle.net/wp-content/up
loads/2011/08/2011NFLRuleBook.pdf.
20. See, e.g., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928).
21. For a discussion of conflicting viewpoints, see Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 389
A.2d 434, 434-35 (N.H. 1978).
22. See id. at 435 ("Water companies are in business to supply water, not to extinguish fires.
Their rates reflect this assumption; they are uniform, not varying with the greater or lesser inher-
ent danger in given areas.").
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law, there is no tort duty of due care owed to the victim. 2 3 One argu-
ment in support of this result is that the Supreme Court has concluded
that a wronged public figure should seek a remedy not in tort law, but
through a reply in the media-access to which, it is assumed, a public
figure will readily have.
The field of financial loss provides yet other instances in which
would-be tort claimants are denied recovery on no-duty grounds be-
cause courts prefer them to pursue other private remedies instead.
Here, the rejection of a tort claim is generally based on the argument
that the victim should seek relief in contract law. 24 For example, if
someone purchases a defective product and suffers financial losses as
a result, then recourse must generally be sought in contract and not
tort.25
For a different example of this same point, assume that one spouse
inflicts emotional distress on the other spouse, who then sues in tort.
Some jurisdictions, which generally allow tort actions for emotional
distress wrongfully imposed on a clearly foreseeable victim, will deny
recovery in such cases on the ground that the offending spouse owes
the other spouse no duty of care in tort.26 One justification for this
result is that the wronged spouse should instead seek relief in family
law through divorce or separation proceedings.
In sum, what characterizes all of these no-duty arguments is that
there is another forum available to the plaintiff to deal with the plain-
tiff's complaint. To be sure, that other forum may in the end provide
no remedy. And even if it does provide a remedy, that remedy might
not address all of the goals said by some to be served by tort-justice,
deterrence, cost internalization, and compensation, for example. Still,
if these reasons are to be believed, the point is that the legal system
has concluded that it would be better for victims to turn elsewhere,
thereby relieving the actor of a legal duty of due care in tort.
23. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 8 & cmt.
e(4) (Council Draft No. 1, 2006) (adopting the "economic loss rule" and discussing when tort is
set aside because of the availability of a contract remedy).
25. See E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986); Seely
v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965).
26. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55
MD. L. REV. 1268, 1301-03 & n.24 (1996) (discussing why a jurisdiction should adopt a rule
barring interspousal claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
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B. The Judicial System Cannot Suitably Administer
Claims like This
A second justification supporting the absence of a duty in tort is
that, in certain types of cases, the judicial process we use to administer
tort claims is simply not capable of properly processing the claims that
would be brought were there a tort duty of due care.
Consider the rule in states like California, which provides that there
is no duty of due care to prevent the negligent infliction of emotional
distress upon someone the defendant did not directly physically im-
pact or threaten to impact, unless that person was both present at the
scene of the harm and a close relative of the physically injured vic-
tim. 2 7 It is easy to imagine instances in which negligently caused inju-
ries to third parties could also cause emotional harm to dozens,
hundreds, or even thousands of individuals who witnessed, read
about, or later saw a video of the direct physical injury the defendant
caused.28 Allowing claims in all such cases could produce a flood of
claims that has the potential to swamp the judicial system, causing
huge delays in the handling of much more serious injuries. This fear
of judicial paralysis is frequently offered as a justification for denying
a tort duty to those who were in fact negligently so harmed.29 These
victims are generally thought to have suffered smaller injuries, com-
paratively speaking, and, for the sake of being able to provide justice
for other claimants, these victims are denied a tort remedy.
I can also understand the flood-of-claims argument when a court
disallows lawsuits by children for both emotional distress and "loss of
consortium" every time a parent is seriously injured by a careless de-
fendant.30 But I am less convinced that a parent who rushes to the
scene of an accident where her child lies seriously harmed should be
denied recovery because she did not witness the initial crash on the
ground that this would open up the courts to too many cases. Yet I
concede that the line needs to be drawn somewhere and, on grounds
of administrative convenience, those with practical experience in these
matters must be trusted to try to draw it sensibly.
A different sort of concern about the inability of the judicial system
to administer certain claims is that the courts-especially juries-will
regularly make multiple mistakes, or will at least be seen by the public
as doing so. This could come in the form of inconsistent decisions
27. E.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
28. Think about the driver who carelessly caused the death of Princess Diana or the doctor
who negligently caused the death of Michael Jackson.
29. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 866 (Cal. 1977).
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about similar facts or outcomes that the public feels confident that it
can second-guess and conclude were inconsistent. We cannot expect
our system to be perfect or totally free from public criticism. But
there could be some types of claims that create an especially acute risk
of this result, which could wind up damaging the legitimacy of the
judicial system in general and thereby cause far greater social harm.
In such cases, it might be thought better simply to deny access to the
courts even if that means the actual victims of another's fault would
go uncompensated.
Here are two examples that are sometimes justified on this basis.
First, in most states, participants in recreational sporting activities owe
each other no duty of ordinary due care in tort.31 One explanation for
this is that juries will not be able to sensibly determine whether the
victim was harmed by the negligence of the fellow participant or
whether the injury was just a risk of the sport. All too often, a finding
by the jury of the former would be seen by the public as more prop-
erly a case of the latter. Second, products liability claims could histor-
ically be brought only against the individual who directly sold the
product to the consumer. 32 One explanation given for this result was
that, because a product passed from a manufacturer' through the
hands of another party to the user-victim, juries would never know
what the original buyer did to, or with, the product, thereby making it
impossible for jurors to properly decide whether it was the initial neg-
ligence of the manufacturer or the fault of someone else that caused
the injury.
Yet another potential problem area for the judicial system concerns
cases in which we worry about collusion between plaintiffs and de-
fendants. Suppose, for example, a husband is driving the family car
and is in an accident in which his wife, who is either a passenger or a
pedestrian, is injured. If the wife sues the husband, it will probably be
to gain access to money provided from the family's liability insurance
policy, which would raise a worry that the husband might concede that
he was negligently driving when he was not. The old common law
family-immunity doctrine would preclude such claims.33 Although
traditionally termed a separate or specialized doctrine, this "immu-
nity" claim is really a no-duty idea, and the fraud concern given in
justification of the doctrine is an example of the justification I am ex-
31. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992).
32. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051-52 (N.Y. 1916); Winterbottom
v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Div.) 405.
33. See Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993) (discussing policy justifications).
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ploring here.34 Most states appear to have abandoned the family-
immunity rule,35 and some states even find that insurance contract
terms that exclude coverage when the claim is by another household
member contrary to public policy. 36 In those states, insurers are sim-
ply left to ferret out any inappropriate collusion on a case-by-case ba-
sis. On balance, this might well be the best solution. My only point
here is to show how the old doctrine might be justified as applicable to
certain intra-family claims on the ground of judicial incompetence to
ferret out the truth.
C. Permitting Tort Claims Will Induce Individuals to Respond in
Socially Unacceptable (Perverse) Ways
A third category of no-duty cases is somewhat anguishing because it
reflects a reluctant acceptance of the idea that in some situations one
has to choose the lesser of two evils. I have in mind a setting in which
the courts conclude that allowing a tort claim would, alas, result in
behavior that is so socially undesirable that, on balance, it is actually
better-or less bad-to deny recovery to the wronged and otherwise
deserving victim.
One example in this category concerns recreational injuries. As
noted above, in a large majority of states, if one skier carelessly
knocks down another skier from behind and injures his victim, a tort
claim will not lie because the injurer is said to owe no duty of ordinary
care to the victim. 3 7 Another justification for this no-duty rule-the
justification I want to focus on here-is the belief that imposing liabil-
ity would have a highly undesirable social outcome; specifically, fear-
ing the possibility of being sued, individuals would be afraid to engage
in sporting activities that carry risks to others and would, in effect,
stay at home and get fat. Put differently, some judges believe that
imposing liability for negligence among participants will cause recrea-
tional activity to come to a halt or, perhaps less dramatically, to be
substantially reduced. 38 That outcome, it is said, would be so undesir-
able that a tort duty will be denied in order to avoid this socially per-
verse response.39
34. Other justifications have also been advanced in support of the family-immunity doctrine.
35. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995) (claims by children against
parents); Waite, 618 So. 2d at 1361 (spousal claims). But see Renko v. McLean, 697 A.2d 468,
470 (Md. 1997).
36. See, e.g., Ky. Farmers Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 1 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Ky. 1999).
37. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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I accept this sort of argument. Yet in this specific setting, I am
rather skeptical about whether it is convincing as an empirical matter.
Knowing how much individuals enjoy playing sports and how ignorant
they are of tort law, I am generally doubtful that skiing and the like
would come to a halt, or be sharply reduced, were ordinary negligence
law applied. This instinct is reinforced because I have not seen good
evidence of the withdrawal from recreational sports in a state like
Wisconsin, which applies the regular tort obligation of due care to
participants. 40
The denial of tort recovery to public figures who are merely negli-
gently defamed by the media has also been justified by a perverse-
behavioral-response argument-that there will be excessive "self-cen-
sorship" by the media so as to chill the exercise of the right to free
speech (that society so greatly values).41 Hence, once more, carelessly
harmed victims are denied recovery in tort. Although this justification
for a no-duty result rests in the First Amendment to the Constitution,
it reflects this category of cases. As the media is hyper-aware of the
possibility of defamation actions, I take the concern about excessive
self-censorship more seriously here, especially when I think about out-
of-state media defendants being sued in local state courts by otherwise
popular local state officials.
Most states have concluded that social hosts should not be held lia-
ble for carelessly serving drinks to their guests.42 These cases typically
arise when the guest later goes out and, because of her drunken state,
carelessly injures the victim, who subsequently sues the host. One jus-
tification for this no-duty rule is that the socially valuable enjoyment
of alcohol in important social settings (weddings, birthday parties, and
the like) will be destroyed as individuals will inevitably overreact in
the face of potential liability.43
Notice that this is but a specialized illustration of one reason that
has historically been used to justify a limited tort duty of social hosts
to their guests as a general matter.44 Fully imposing on hosts the due-
care principle, some have argued, would cause individuals to stop (or
reduce) hosting others out of an exaggerated fear of liability.45 More
40. See, e.g., Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993).
41. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
42. Nina J. Emerson & Sarah B. Stroebel, Another Look at Dram Shop Liability, 73 Wis.
LAw., Aug. 2000, at 14, 17.
43. See Reynolds v. Hicks, 951 P.2d 761, 764-65 (Wash. 1998).
44. The Restatement (Second) of Torts treated a land possessor's obligations to licensees,
which include the guests of social hosts, through a variety of provisions. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 330, 341-342, 343B (1965).
45. See Reynolds, 951 P.2d at 764-65.
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precisely, a fear of this perverse social response has been historically
used to justify what at common law was a partial no-duty obligation
toward licensees. By now, however, a majority of states have, in gen-
eral, lumped licensees and invitees together, holding that both are
owed the full duty of due care (in the relevant circumstances),46 which
suggests that most courts are no longer concerned about a serious de-
cline in social interaction. But for the minority of states that have
retained the old distinction,47 a fear of perverse behavioral responses
still may justify no-duty outcomes. Moreover, even in the majority-
rule states, many legislatures have responded to the change in the
common law with specialized, so-called "recreational use of land"
statutes out of a fear that applying the ordinary tort-duty rules would
cause too many individuals who freely allow or tolerate their land be-
ing used for recreational activities to fence their land off and deny
recreational access to the substantial detriment of individuals seeking
to enjoy the outdoors.48 In effect, legislatures have concluded that it
is better to maintain public access than it is to threaten landowners
with liability for failing to address dangers they should have known
and done something about.
The American rule that strangers owe no tort duty to take reasona-
ble steps to save endangered fellow citizens49 is justified on many
grounds. One justification is the concern that imposing a duty would
lead to perverse behavioral responses.50 One such response might be
that some individuals would become officious intermeddlers, rushing
in to annoy individuals who do not need help.5 ' Another is that some
individuals would feel bound to attempt rescues when they are not
competent to do so and, in their bumbling, would make things
worse.52 Yet another is that some individuals would be afraid to go
out into the world for fear of being held responsible for failing to help
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 &
cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
47. See, e.g., Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 330 cmt. h(3) (1965).
48. See Bragg v. Genesee Cnty. Agric. Soc'y, 644 N.E.2d 1013, 1017-18 (N.Y. 1994) (discuss-
ing recreational use of land statutes).
49. E.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 221-22 & n.3 (Mich. 1976); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (2010) ("In excep-
tional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that
the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.").
50. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure
of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv 879, 882 (1986).
51. Id. at 886-87.
52. Cf id. at 905 ("It is also possible that potential finders will actually cause losses and then
hide the items that they find from their true owners.").
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others they encounter.53 In sum, these concerns about perverse be-
havioral responses have been used to justify no duty in tort. Whether
these concerns are empirically justified is another matter. There does
not seem to be evidence of these bad outcomes from European na-
tions that impose a tort duty on those who fail to make "easy" res-
cues. 54 Still, were these fears based in reality, one can appreciate why
a no-duty rule would be adopted.55
Some have tried to justify the previously discussed fireman's rule on
the ground that, without such a rule, individuals who carelessly set
fires would refrain from timely calling the fire department and would
instead foolishly try to put out the fire themselves, thereby risking not
only larger harm to their own property but potentially harm to the
property of others.56 This justification also rests on the ground that
such a perverse behavioral response makes it better to deny, rather
than allow, recovery to the carelessly injured firefighter. Were this
fear truly warranted, I could again appreciate the force of the argu-
ment. Yet absent solid empirical evidence, it strikes me as wild specu-
lation that owners would actually risk increased damage to their
property because of a vague fear that a firefighter called to the scene
might be injured by the flames and then sue the careless owner, espe-
cially when the owner's tort liability would normally be covered by his
fire insurance policy.
Following the California Supreme Court's decision in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California, a majority of states now recog-
nize a duty of mental health professionals to warn a targeted victim
when a patient of the professional has seriously threatened to kill or
maim that person.57 Yet, some courts and scholars reject imposing a
duty of due care in such settings by raising concerns about perverse
behavioral responses. These concerns are threefold: (1) patients will
stop seeking therapy or stop being candid with their therapists; (2)
therapists will wrongly commit patients to mental institutions so as to
53. See id. at 884.
54. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
55. Adding to the empirical argument on this issue, one might claim that even without a legal
duty, most competent individuals voluntarily engage in "easy" rescues anyway so that the upside
behavioral gain from imposing tort liability in such settings would be minimal at best. But this
alone may not overcome the concern on the other side that someone who could easily have
engaged in an easy rescue, but did not, should escape liability. For another possible justification
of a no-duty result in such settings, see discussion infra Part II.D.
56. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 431 (5th ed.
1984).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 42
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353
(Cal. 1976).
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assure themselves of not being sued were the patient to attack some-
one; and (3) by way of overdeterrence, therapists will excessively warn
of possible attacks, causing mental harm to third parties. In fact, these
concerns seem not to have played out over the years in which a duty
has been imposed in such situations, but one can appreciate how
courts at the outset might have been apprehensive.58
Difficult cases arise when criminals come into places of business
and threaten customers with weapons as a way to force employees to
turn over their cash. Suppose an employee refuses and the criminal
then shoots a customer in anger. Assume the customer or her heirs
then sue the business, clAimifig that a reasonable employee would
have turned over the money. Focusing only on the case before it, a
jury might well agree and find the defendant liable. Yet, courts might
believe that to allow this result would increase the number of now-
emboldened robbers, leading not only to more lost cash but, inevita-
bly, more injured bystanders. Once more, I find such a view, which
has been used to justify a no-duty rule in this sort of case,59 to be
questionable as an empirical matter. But I concede that it is in the
same vein as the position held by many that in the end it is better to
stick firmly to the position that "we do not negotiate with terrorists."
In the case of Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, the
plaintiff-student claimed to have been sexually molested by a school
employee who, it appears, had engaged in similar misconduct in the
past that his former employer knew about.60 But when asked for a
reference by his potential new employer, his former employer praised
him and said nothing about his apparent misbehavior.61 The plaintiff
understandably argued that had the former employer been forthcom-
ing, her district would not have hired the person and she would not
have been molested.62 The California Supreme Court upheld her tort
claim against the former employer, at least with respect to allegations
of misrepresentation. 63 Defendants argued that allowing such tort
claims would undermine the job reference system to such a degree
that in the future, former employers would simply acknowledge that X
58. See Peter H. Schuck & Daniel J. Givelber, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia: The Therapist's Dilemma, in TORTs STORIES 99, 113-17 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003) (discussing the duty imposed by Tarasoff).
59. See, e.g., Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 306 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ill. 1973); see also Ky.
Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 927 P.2d 1260, 1266-70 (Cal. 1997)
(listing cases).
60. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Cal. 1997).
61. Id. at 585.
62. See id. at 586.
63. Id. at 595.
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worked for them and would refuse to say anything about X, good or
bad. Were this perverse response to occur, it would deprive those on
the hiring side from valuable information about prospective employ-
ees.6 4 For some, this is a good reason to deny the assault victim's
claim by deciding that the former employer owed the victim no duty
in tort.
Florida's and Virginia's so-called "bad baby" compensation plans
might also illustrate this perspective. 65 Those legislatures, some argue,
curtailed the tort rights of newborns harmed by the medical malprac-
tice of certain doctors because of their determination that allowing
such tort claims would deprive the citizens of the state, more gener-
ally, of essential medical services. 66 Doctors, it was thought, would
flee-and perhaps were already fleeing-to other states. The NVICP,
discussed above, 67 also arguably reflects this justification: Congress
curtailed tort rights because of the fear of a socially worse conse-
quence of keeping them in place-the public loss of firms willing to
make essential vaccines. Notice that in both these instances, the deci-
sion to create an alternative realm for the victims to turn for compen-
sation was driven by the concern that existing duties of care in tort law
were creating perverse responses that were socially intolerable.
In contrast, in most of the other examples I have discussed in this
category, governments have not created specific alternative compen-
sation plans to which victims can turn. That said, perhaps it is worth
mentioning that many states have created "victims of violent crimes"
laws, to which some individuals being denied tort claims can apply.
Alas, these state compensation plans have functioned poorly and pay
very modest benefits, usually only to destitute victims and all too
often after extremely long delays.68
D. Trumping Social Values Override the Victim's Claim in Tort
I put a related fourth category of no-duty cases under the heading
of "trumping social values." This brings us to the first of three value-
based justifications. In these cases, the courts conclude that a broader
and more important social value is at stake, one that would be unac-
64. See id. at 590.
65. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA. STAT. §§ 766.301-316
(2010); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-
5000 to -5021 (1950 & repl. vol. 2007).
66. Peter H. White, Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74
VA. L. REV. 1487, 1496-97 (1988).
67. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
68. For an early analysis and historical background, see Robert E. Scott, Note, Compensation
for Victims of Violent Crimes: An Analysis, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 277 (1967).
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ceptably sacrificed if a duty of ordinary care were imposed. Put differ-
ently, this value trumps the normal desirability of discouraging and
punishing conduct that juries conclude to be unreasonable. In this
category, therefore, it does not matter whether imposing a tort duty
would result in changed and undesirable behavior. If that were the
case, this could shift the example to the "perverse behavioral re-
sponse" category. As I see it, that prior category concerns an overall
appraisal of the net social utility of allowing or disallowing tort claims
in such settings, and the empirical reality of how individuals respond
to the, law matters greatly. By contrast, this "trumping values" cate-
gory turns on a judicial appraisal of the value of the defendant's
behavior.
It is important to see that this no-duty reason is not quite the same
as a no-breach reason, although they are quite similar. Take, for ex-
ample, the already-discussed common law rule that there is no duty in
tort to come to the assistance of strangers.69 Relevant here is a differ-
ent justification from the belief that perverse and unhelpful behavioral
responses would occur if there were such a duty. Rather, I want to
focus on the justification that the liberty to remain uninvolved with
other individuals' problems trumps the obligation to help them even
when, in a specific case, a jury thought or might think it reasonable to
do so.
One might argue that the courts in this situation are merely weigh-
ing the burden of rescuing against the benefit to the victim and so are
making a breach determination for each particular case. But I do not
think this is the right way to think about it. Rather, I think that courts
are saying that the liberty right to remain uninvolved is of such impor-
tance that it trumps the entire idea of holding potential rescuers to a
duty of due care toward strangers. It is, in a sense, making a decision
at the wholesale level, whereas juries' breach decisions are made one
by one at the retail level. Moreover, courts might be concerned that,
in considering the burden on liberty in an individual case, juries might
not have a wide enough perspective to take the liberty value fully into
account. For that reason, courts seize on this category of injuries and
decide such cases as a matter of law.
The common law no-duty rule has its special bite in cases in which it
was obvious who could have come to the victim's assistance and where
a nearly effortless act could have saved the victim from a terrible in-
jury or death. In such cases, juries indeed might find the defendant to
have been unreasonable were they permitted to do so. But if courts
69. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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view the defendant's liberty interest to be important enough, then the
no-duty result follows.
For myself, I fail to see why the liberty value is so important to
protect in instances in which an obvious defendant could so easily
have saved the victim's life, but I acknowledge that others may see
this differently. And I concur that our liberty could be compromised
if potential victims could begin using tort law to involuntarily enlist us
in their aid on the grounds that it would benefit them at what an indi-
vidual jury might consider to be an acceptable cost.
A similar analysis might apply to cases that exempt from liability
movie and television directors who depict an unusual act of violence
that is soon thereafter engaged in by copycats who attack the plaintiff-
victim. 7 0 What I am imagining here is a jury that focuses solely on the
victim of this attack might well find (with its retail perspective) that
the defendant should have known of the risk of a copycat response
and was unreasonable in portraying this episode or scene on television
or in film. That is, the jury might heavily discount the value of the
artistic free expression at stake in a larger sense because it is looking
at the burden of eliminating this scene solely in this case. But a court,
especially an appellate court, may take a wholesale look at the matter
and conclude that artistic freedom is too important and that it would
be socially unacceptable in settings like this to burden media
presenters with the cost of copycat conduct, even if the jury were to
decide that the attack would not have happened but for the showing
of the film.
Notice that this justification does not depend upon showing that im-
posing a tort duty in such settings would have a chilling effect on the
director's right of free expression, thereby causing film makers to
steer too wide a berth from controversial depictions of violence. That
sort of justification falls under the "perverse behavioral response" cat-
egory discussed above. Rather, the argument here is that the defen-
dant's freedom of expression is especially important to protect from
the financial burdens of tort law.
E. The Victims Are Morally Undeserving
A fifth category of no-duty cases concerns victims thought to be so
morally undeserving that the courts will not open their doors to such a
person even if he has been carelessly injured by another.
I think that this principle initially justified the common law doctrine
of contributory negligence. That is, the wrongful nature of the vic-
70. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892-94 (Ct. App. 1981).
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tim's act made the claimant completely undeserving of recovery
against someone who carelessly caused him harm. While this common
law rule is typically called a "defense," it functioned as a no-duty rule.
That is, so far as tort law was concerned, it was alright to carelessly
harm such victims because of their unworthiness.
While this rule's complete bar is now generally overturned, there
are other examples of tort doctrine that reflect this outlook. First,
there is the original and parallel rule that land occupiers owe no tort
duty to trespassers.71 Again, one justification of this rule is that the
undeserving nature of trespassers meant that land owners could care-
lessly cause them harm and escape responsibility for that harm. Of
course, over time this rule too was substantially weakened so as to
allow certain classes of (less wrongful) trespassers to recover in cer-
tain circumstances against merely negligent land owners.72 And in
Rowland v. Christian, the California Supreme Court, in a decision
later followed in a small number of other states,73 completely aban-
doned this no-duty-to-trespassers rule. 7 4 And yet in response, the
California legislature and the Restatement (Third) of Torts have con-
cluded as a matter of principle that some especially undeserving tres-
passers are still owed no duty of ordinary care in tort by land
possessors.75
Moreover, even in states that seemingly have replaced the complete
defense of contributory negligence with pure comparative fault, one
can find unusual cases in which recovery is denied to some flagrantly
careless victims of other individuals' negligence (outside of the tres-
passer setting). This might occur, for example, when the victim is en-
gaged in criminal or other highly socially unacceptable conduct, like
making a pipe bomb. 76 While, doctrinally, courts might say that com-
parative fault was not meant to apply in this setting and therefore re-
71. William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 427 (1959).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334-339 (1965) (allowing recovery under cer-
tain circumstances for constant trespassers, known trespassers, and child trespassers).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 Re-
porters' Note cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
74. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
75. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West 2007) (extending immunity from liability to landowners
when the injury was sustained during or after the commission of certain felonies); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 (Tentative Draft No. 6,
2009) (lowering the duty owed to flagrant trespassers who are not "helpless" or "unable to pro-
tect themselves"). For the background story that led to the adoption of the California statute,
see Wendy Lilliedoll, An Unexpected Windfall for California's Tort Reform Movement: Bodine
v. Enterprise High School 34-44 (2004) (unpublished student paper), available at http://www.law.
berkeley.edulsugarman/Wendy-TortStoryFinaljii.doc.
76. See, e.g., Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 40, 44 (N.Y. 1984).
686 [Vol. 61:669
WHY NO DUTY?
covery will be denied in full under the prior contributory negligence
principle, a better understanding of this result is that there is no duty
of ordinary care owed to such undeserving claimants.
F. Imposing a Duty of Care on This Defendant Would Result
in an Unfairly Crushing Liability
I put in this final no-duty category cases in which the defendant has
been negligent in the ordinary sense and harm has been done. But the
harm is so enormous as compared with the nature of the defendant's
wrongdoing that the consequence of the conventional application of
tort law would be, in the view of judges, an unfairly disproportionate
punishment of the defendant's misconduct. In such instances, we see
courts finding ways to limit liability via the invocation of no-duty
rules.
Some of these cases concern public utilities (or similar defendants)
in which a single lower level employee carelessly acts in a way that
causes untold harms to a vast number of individuals. Courts seem
quite concerned that, absent a no-duty limit, the defendant would be
subject to inappropriately crushing liability. Were the utility to be de-
stroyed by tort law and no other firm would be willing step into the
role, then such a case would be best put into the "perverse behavioral
response" category. But my sense is that these cases do not depend
on the community having to go without this vital public service were
tort law to function in its normal way. Rather, it is simply the quantity
of liability that sufficiently troubles the courts and causes them to step
in and limit the defendant's exposure.
For example, we have seen this sort of justification given by the
New York Court of Appeals in support of limiting the recovery of
damages to actual customers of Consolidated Edison following the
utility's careless causing of the famous New York City blackout.7 7
Similarly, utility-crushing liability is sometimes given as a justification
for the no-duty rule with respect to water companies that negligently
cause water to be unavailable at fire hydrants when needed to fight
fires.78 For myself, I find these crushing-liability arguments somewhat
dubious. Public utilities can generally pass on their tort liability
through higher rates to their customers or spread their tort liability
among other utilities via liability insurance. There is also something
unsavory about allowing one to be let off for carelessly causing a huge
amount of harm, as compared with someone who causes only a mod-
77. See Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36-38 (N.Y. 1985).
78. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897-98 (N.Y. 1928).
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est amount of harm. Nonetheless, I do concede the moral argument
that the penalty can seem wildly disproportionate in certain cases, and
I agree that if one accepts that argument as compelling, then no duty
in tort follows.
In a similar vein is Congress's decision to limit, in advance, the po-
tential tort liability of power companies that could possibly arise from
the operation of nuclear power plants.79 Although a statutory solu-
tion, rather than one from common law, the congressional vision at
the time was that nuclear power was very important for the nation to
develop. But the utilities were refusing to provide nuclear power for
fear of crushing liability.80 As a result, victim compensation that
might be obtained from the utilities in the event of nuclear accident
was restricted (although at the same time at least some compensation
was guaranteed).81
G. Summary of No-Duty Grounds
I believe that these six categories of justifications reflect appropri-
ate arguments in favor of no-duty rules. They are not about the likeli-
hood of harm or the burden of preventing it-the two major inquiries
made in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's actions (in
other words, whether he breached his duty). To the contrary, they rest
on considerations that could lead one to conclude that, overall and on
balance, it would be unwise to allow a tort claim by someone who
might otherwise be able to recover on the ground that the defendant
unreasonably failed to prevent the injury. Perhaps others will put for-
ward different categories of reasons or will decide to regroup the rea-
sons I have advanced in a different way. What is most important for
now, I think, is to always keep in mind that the arguments advanced
here are in support of freeing a potential defendant from tort liability
when a jury found or might reasonably find him to have failed to exer-
cise due care under the circumstances.
III. THE CONFUSION OF BREACH AND DUTY
Having now described the sorts of arguments that might justify a
no-duty rule, I want to return to a point I raised briefly at the outset:
the duty element in tort cases sounding in negligence is much con-
fused and much abused.
79. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (2006). Yet because of the seemingly realis-
tic fear that without tort limitation, there would be no nuclear power industry, perhaps this
example seems better put in the "perverse behavioral response" category.
80. See MARc A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVEs 884 (9th ed. 2011).
81. Id.
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It is often said that while breach is a question for the jury (or more
generally the trier of fact), duty is a question for the judge-a differ-
ence that is perhaps most salient when there is a jury, although even in
bench trials it is important to keep the duty and breach issues dis-
tinct.8 2 Alas, this old saying, about which issue is for which actor, is
wrong and contributes to the confusion.
Judges, both at the trial and appellate levels, have roles in the
breach question beyond merely stating for the jury the legal principle
that breach is a matter of deciding how a reasonable person should act
under the circumstances and then gauging the defendant's conduct
against that. After all, trial judges may, and indeed do, have an obli-
gation to decide whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable or
unreasonable as a matter of law-at least when asked by the appropri-
ate party through a proper motion (for example, a motion for a di-
rected verdict or summary judgment). The test against which these
motions are measured is whether a jury could reasonably decide oth-
erwise.83 If not, then the judge is to step in and assert that there was
or was not a breach.
In practice, plaintiffs rarely ask for these rulings because, generally
speaking, if the plaintiff's lawyer thinks that the case is strong enough
to get a directed verdict, then the lawyer is usually not worried about
the jury deciding against her client. And to ask for and have such a
motion granted even in a very strong case-when there is any risk that
this could be overturned on appeal, thereby causing delay and requir-
ing a new trial-is something that the plaintiff is eager to avoid. De-
fendants typically feel otherwise. They worry that juries will find
them at fault when they were not, and if the judge grants a directed
verdict that is later overturned, defendants-who get to keep their
money while all of this is going on-are much less bothered by delays.
The point, in any event, is that when no jury could reasonably find
that the defendant failed to exercise due care and the defendant asks
for a directed verdict and gets it, the breach issue has been decided by
the trial judge and not the jury.
Moreover, appellate courts sometimes decide the breach issue or
make a decision that dictates the outcome of the breach issue. The
former happens when the appellate court, in effect, chastises the trial
judge for failing to properly grant a directed verdict request by the
defendant. For example, even though appellate judges normally defer
to the judgment of trial judges, who personally encountered the evi-
82. E.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 219-20 (Mich. 1976).
83. See, e.g., Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1994).
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dence, including live witnesses, an appellate court will occasionally
conclude that, even seen in the best light possible, the plaintiff simply
has failed to offer proof that could reasonably demonstrate a lack of
due care by the defendant. These cases tend to be of two sorts. On
the one hand, the harm that took place may be so unexpected that the
appellate court concludes, and explains why, the injury was unforesee-
able. And it cannot be unreasonable to fail to avoid harms that you
could not plausibly imagine would occur. Hence, because de minimis
risk-taking conduct is not something that the reasonable person would
avoid, someone taking such a risk may not be found at fault. On the
other hand, sometimes the amount of cost or effort that would have
been required by the defendant to avoid the harm that took place is so
self-evidently overwhelming that it would unquestionably be unrea-
sonable to ask the defendant to bear that burden. In those cases too,
appellate courts sometimes decide that there was no breach as a mat-
ter of law. For the purposes of this Article, the vital thing to appreci-
ate is that in these cases the judges are deciding the breach issue and
not the duty issue.
A good example is Adams v. Bullock, a case in which a boy had
swung a wire in the air that caught on overhead trolley wires, sending
live electricity into his body and seriously injuring him. 84 For Judge
Cardozo, this sort of freak harm was simply unforeseeable; it had
never happened before, according to the proof tendered, and the cir-
cumstances did not make the live wires appear to Cardozo to be dan-
gerously in harm's way.85 Moreover, as Cardozo saw it, there was
nothing that the trolley company could reasonably do about it any-
way.86 It could not insulate its wires because then the trolley could
not function, and having the power train put underground was alto-
gether too much to ask.87 Hence, looked at from either side of what
later has become known as the Hand Formula in deciding the breach
issue (is PL greater than B?), both the P (the probability part of the
risk consideration) and the B (the burden side of the equation) are
overwhelmingly in the defendant's favor.88 When there can be no
other result than a finding of no breach by the defendant, one can
understand why Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of Ap-
84. Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93 (N.Y. 1919).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 94.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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peals, reversed the trial judge and the jury verdict for the plaintiff that
the trial judge had allowed to stand, and ordered a new trial.89
Some qualifications should be offered about this famous opinion.
First, it turns out that at that time many children were in fact being
injured by coming in contact (usually via other wires) with live train
and trolley wires, something that the defendant trolley line probably
should have known about-and probably did-although the plaintiff's
lawyer oddly failed to offer proof of this past experience. 90 Second,
while undergrounding the power might have been too much to ask of
the defendant, putting up a shield or guard at the particular point of
the injury arguably was not. This was a unique place on the trolley
line where individuals were above the wires on a well-used bridge and
much closer than normal to the trolley wires, which could be reached
(as the plaintiff did) with the help of gravity. So, maybe the outcome
of the case is one that is actually best explained by inadequate repre-
sentation of the plaintiff.
Perhaps more important for my purposes, Cardozo's opinion has a
different exasperating feature. As I see it, he is clearly deciding the
breach question, and as I have already said, I have no problem with
courts doing so when juries could not reasonably decide otherwise.
But, he uses the "duty" word.91 This is wrong and misleading. To be
sure, it is a correct usage of the English language to say that the defen-
dant had "no duty" to bury the wires underground. But, as a legal
matter, this mixes up duty and breach. There was no issue of "duty"
presented to the New York Court of Appeals. Had harms like this
been shown to be common and well known to trolley lines and had
powerful evidence been presented that this bridge was evidently a
specially dangerous locale for such an injury-one that could have
been avoided by spending a couple of dollars on a wooden guard over
the wire as it emerged from under the bridge-then there seems no
doubt that the jury verdict for the plaintiff would have been upheld.
Hence, what Cardozo should more precisely have said was that, under
these facts, it was not unreasonable to fail to underground the trolley,
that failing to do so did not amount to failing to exercise due care, or
that a reasonable trolley line would not have buried the wires-all
ways of emphasizing that there was no breach.
89. Adams, 125 N.E. at 94.
90. For the story behind this well-known case, see Elizabeth Smallwood, A First-Year Tort
Law Institution: Adams v. Bullock (2004) (unpublished student paper), available at http:lwww.
law.berkeley.edu/sugarman/adamsfinal-1.doc.
91. Adams, 125 N.E. at 94.
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In the same vein, consider Harper v. Herman, a case in which a
young man dove off a recreational boat and seriously injured himself
when it turned out that the water into which he dove was quite shal-
low. 9 2 The owner and operator of this small craft knew of the shallow
water, where he deliberately anchored for his passengers to go swim-
ming.93 The court concluded, however, that he had no duty to warn
the passenger of the water's depth without adequately explaining
why.94 It seems to me that there is hardly any liberty interest of the
boat captain at stake and that a duty of due care should have been
imposed. After all, the victim was a welcomed passenger on the de-
fendant's craft. Whether or not there was a breach is another matter,
however. It appears that the young man may well have dove in
quickly, in a way that the captain did not anticipate, making it not
actually unreasonable to have failed to give a warning. But that is not
a duty matter.
Frequently the breach question is well understood to be a fresh
matter to be decided entirely on the facts of the specific case. Due
care, or breach, is a "standard" against which the defendant's conduct
is measured by the jury (or fact-finding judge in a bench trial). I have
assumed this to be the case in the discussion so far. But in some situa-
tions, appellate courts have decided to adopt or announce "rules" that
more precisely specify what is or is not due care in a certain type of
case.95
One advantage of rules is that case results are likely to be more
consistent; for example, the same facts will be decided in the same
way (either breach or no breach), rather than being left to juries who
might find the identical conduct reasonable in some cases and unrea-
sonable in others. A second advantage is that rules make clear to de-
fendants in advance just what is expected of them, which may provide
some sense of security to those who want to do things but not run
afoul of the law. A third advantage is that cases may well be more
quickly settled, or indeed, resolved without formal legal proceedings,
when it is reasonably clear to both sides what the legal outcome will
be.
Rules have costs, however. They fail to take into account the myr-
iad of little factual variations in cases subject to the rule, and those
facts might actually, in close cases, make the defendant's conduct
judged to be other than what the rule specifies. The rule that requires
92. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993).
93. Id. at 473.
94. See id. at 475.
95. Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531, 534-35 (N.Y. 1981).
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motor vehicle drivers to get out of their vehicles at railroad crossings
and look down the track if they could not see far enough for safety
from the driver's seat is a good example (albeit applicable to plain-
tiff's, not defendant's fault). 96 It turns out that certain grade crossings
have such complex configurations that it would actually be unreasona-
bly foolish to get out to look down the track, but a victim who failed
to do so would be deemed negligent under the rule. This problem is
nicely illustrated by Justice Holmes's opinion in Goodman, which first
set out the rule, and then by Justice Cardozo's later opinion in
Pokora, which effectively scuttles the rule.9 7
A different example of a rule would be that it is unforeseeable that
a criminal would injure a patron in one's parking lot if this had not
happened previously.9 8 Hence, the first person harmed on the defen-
dant's property in this way would always lose. In such instances, the
failure of the plaintiff to win should be understood as a no-breach
determination and not one about there being no duty to take precau-
tions against the harm that happened.
One problem with a rule that exempts first victims from recovery is
that sometimes other facts might demonstrate that, in certain areas
and with respect to certain property, it was actually not at all unfore-
seeable that someone might be attacked in the parking lot-say, for
example, dozens of these attacks had recently occurred in parking lots
right down the block and the defendant was well aware of that. Those
considerations favor using the due-care standard over a rule.
When doing so, however, courts sometimes continue to confuse
duty and breach. In Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the victim, who
had been shopping at the defendant's store, was attacked in the defen-
dant's parking lot.99 The court concluded that, given the limited past
history of similar attacks, the risk of harm to the plaintiff was slight.100
(So far, so good.) But it was misleading then to conclude that the
defendant owed the victim no duty to protect her from the crime.101
Instead it should have said that there was, as a matter of law, no
breach of the duty of due care that the defendants clearly did owe to a
customer and invitee on their property.
96. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
97. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 102-06 (1934).
98. See Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 766-68 (La. 1999) (discussing various
rules states have adopted on this issue).
99. Id. at 764.
100. Id. at 768-69.
101. Id. at 769.
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A different cost of a rule is that sometimes the rule reflects an un-
derstanding of the available harm-avoiding technology at the time the
rule was adopted and yet later on new technology has become availa-
ble that would make it much easier to avoid the harm in question.
Additionally, rules may not reflect the fluid nature of society's under-
standing of what sort of precautions defendants should reasonably
take. For example, society may become more risk averse (or the op-
posite), or the value of a life saved may be thought to be much more
than it previously was. In such situations a defendant could be found
not negligent for complying with a rule when a contemporary jury,
reflecting today's social judgment, would have found the defendant to
be at fault for not preventing the injury.
In my view, these reasons-combined with more talented plaintiff
lawyers-have substantially undercut the use of rules and have made
negligence law increasingly more a matter of deciding whether there
was a breach in the specific circumstances-namely, applying the due-
care standard and not applying a due-care rule. Nonetheless, where
there is a rule as to what constitutes breach, that rule should be ap-
plied by the trial judge both in giving instructions to the jury and,
more importantly, in deciding whether the rule was complied with as a
matter of law; and if so, deciding for the defendant if the proper mo-
tion has been made.
But all of this is about breach. It is all about deciding in one way or
another, in one context or another, whether the defendant or plaintiff
was at fault. It is not about duty. Hence, if the rule calls for the de-
fendant to do X and the defendant does X but fails to do Y, it is not
helpful and only confusing to say that the defendant has no duty to do
Y. Rather, the right thing to say is that the defendant did not breach
his duty to act with due care by failing to do Y.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the Restatement of Torts and in the decisions of common law
courts throughout the country, the absence of duty in tort arises in
what appear to be highly varied contexts. Typically the courts seem to
pay little attention to themes that run across doctrinal areas. In this
Article, I have attempted to draw together a range of no-duty issues
by gathering them under six general headings. These, I hope, show us
that there are indeed a number of reasons why we might want to deny
potential plaintiffs the right to a tort recovery against someone who
carelessly injured another. By seeing that these same themes arise in
different settings, we may become more thoughtful about how to de-
cide cases when new no-duty claims arise. We might also be willing to
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reassess whether or not the reason given for a no-duty result in some
specific setting is actually convincing (especially when set alongside
other situations in which this same reason has been offered). I also
hope that I have succeeded in distinguishing no-duty problems from
no-breach problems by demonstrating ways in which courts, while
perhaps coming to the right solution, have mislabeled the doctrine
under which they are actually justifying the result. That distinction
should further help to clear up the point that duty is not about fault.
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